Botmaster Phil Godzin’s Syria conflict deaths forecast, Aug. 28, 2025

How many state-based conflict deaths in Syria will be reported by ACLED for the month of August, 2025?

Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:

Less than 100: 2%
Between 100 and 250: 8%
Between 250 and 500: 30%
Between 500 and 1,000: 40%
Greater than 1,000: 20%

12–15 minutes read. This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)

Perplexity response:

## Available Citations and Summaries
Unfortunately, the search results provided are quite limited and don’t contain the specific ACLED data needed for this forecast. Here’s what information is available:

** Instagram Post on Syrian Electoral Committee** (August 23, 2025)
Mentions an internal Israeli intelligence database recording around 8,900 fighters killed as of May 2025, but lacks specificity about timeframe, methodology, and whether this aligns with ACLED’s state-based conflict death definitions.
** Sea Guardian Threat Assessment** (August 28, 2025)
Notes that Syria’s interim government faces mounting challenges restoring order after nearly 14 years of civil war following Assad’s ouster. This provides context about ongoing instability but no specific casualty data.
** Syrian Network for Human Rights** (August 23, 2025)
Describes SNHR’s methodology for documenting human rights violations in Syria since 2011, but doesn’t provide specific August 2025 data or ACLED figures.

Grok response:

**Title:** UN: Syrian factions committed ‘widespread and systematic’ attacks on civilians in coastal violence
**Description:** An AP News article on UN findings regarding violence in Syria’s coastal regions.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately two weeks ago (mid-August 2025, based on context)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article details UN investigations into massacres and attacks in March and April 2025, attributing widespread violence to both interim government forces and Assad loyalists, which could include state-based conflict deaths. It reports that these acts involved murder and torture, potentially amounting to war crimes, with implications for ongoing August instability. The source underscores the need for accountability, noting that such violence has persisted into mid-2025, affecting civilian tolls.
**Title:** War crimes likely committed in Syria coastal violence, UN says
**Description:** A BBC News article summarizing a UN commission’s assessment of sectarian violence in Syria.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately two weeks ago (mid-August 2025)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This piece covers UN findings that war crimes were likely committed by former regime fighters and interim government forces during March 2025 clashes, resulting in significant civilian and combatant deaths. It links these events to broader state-based conflicts, including attacks in Alawite areas, which may have carried over into August. The article highlights the potential for ongoing violence, with UN experts calling for investigations into the rising death toll.
**Title:** Eight Months After Assad’s Fall: Nearly 10,000 Killed, Including 1,000 Women and Children
**Description:** A Syrian Observer article documenting overall casualties in Syria post-regime change.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately three weeks ago (August 6, 2025)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This source provides data from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, reporting 9,889 total deaths by August 6, 2025, with a significant portion linked to state-based violence involving government and militia forces. It breaks down casualties by category, including civilians and combatants, suggesting that ongoing clashes in regions like the coast could push August figures higher. The article highlights the persistence of violence eight months after Assad’s fall, serving as a key indicator of state-based conflict trends.
**Title:** 2025 massacres of Syrian Alawites
**Description:** A Wikipedia page on sectarian violence targeting Alawite communities in Syria.
**Date of Publication:** June 30, 2025 (with potential updates)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This entry documents mass killings from March to April 2025, attributing many deaths to attacks by caretaker government-aligned fighters and civilians, classifying them as state-based conflicts. It reports patterns of targeted violence that resulted in dozens to hundreds of fatalities, with implications for August’s totals if similar incidents persist. The source notes the broader context of the Syrian civil war, urging caution in interpreting casualty data.

Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/‘]

GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:

ACLED’s “state-based conflict deaths” category counts fatalities directly attributable to clashes involving state actors (regular forces, security services, or state-aligned militias) — not every violent death in-country. ACLED typically reports monthly totals; the resolution will be whatever ACLED publishes for “Syria — August 2025” under that category. I do not have ACLED’s August release in front of me, so I forecast based on recent patterns from multiple monitors and the qualitative situation on the ground in late summer 2025.

What the recent context implies: independent monitors and UN reporting in mid‑August documented large-scale sectarian and coastal violence earlier in 2025 (March–April), and continuing clashes (e.g., southern/Suwayda fighting in July) produced high weekly death counts in mid‑July (one weekly update cited ~504 deaths in a week). Those indicators point to an elevated baseline of violence into mid‑2025, and ACLED flagged Syria as a high‑risk hotspot in August. However, not all recent killings are necessarily classified as “state‑based” by ACLED (some may be non‑state vs non‑state, or criminal incidents), and ACLED’s methods can diverge from local observers (SOHR, SNHR) in magnitude and classification. Given that, August’s total could easily be in the several hundreds to low thousands, but there is substantial uncertainty.

Gemini Multiple Choice response:

Several sources confirm that Syria continues to experience significant state-based conflict following the ouster of Assad. The Syrian interim government faces ongoing challenges in restoring order after nearly 14 years of civil war. UN investigations from mid-August 2025 have detailed “widespread and systematic” attacks, implicating both interim government forces and Assad loyalists in massacres and other acts that constitute war crimes during March and April 2025. These reports suggest a persistent and severe level of violence attributable to state actors.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported a total of 9,889 deaths by August 6, 2025, since Assad’s fall. This averages to approximately 1,236 deaths per month across all categories of conflict. While this is a total figure and not exclusively “state-based” or from ACLED, a “significant portion” is linked to state-based violence. Furthermore, a Syria Weekly newsletter reported an astonishing **at least 504 deaths between July 15-22, 2025**, with 96% of these linked to major violence, including state-based clashes. This single weekly figure, already surpassing the “Less than 500” options, serves as a strong indicator of the current high intensity of conflict. Ongoing clashes in southern Syria involving transitional government forces were also reported as continuing into late August 2025. ACLED itself flagged Syria as a “high-risk area for evolving conflicts,” noting the likelihood of increased violence in 2025 due to post-regime instability and state actor involvement.

Anthropic response:

Syria remains in a highly unstable transitional period following Assad’s ouster, with the interim government struggling to establish control. The UN has documented war crimes and systematic attacks through mid-2025, with significant violence in coastal and southern regions. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported 9,889 total deaths by August 6, 2025, since Assad’s fall, which averages roughly 1,235 deaths per month over 8 months. However, this includes all conflict-related deaths, not just state-based ones, and ACLED uses specific methodology that typically captures a subset of total conflict deaths.

The July 2025 data is particularly informative – the Syria Weekly newsletter documented 504 deaths in just one week (July 15-22), with 96% linked to major violence including state-based clashes in Suwayda. If this pace continued, it would suggest monthly totals potentially exceeding 2,000 deaths. However, conflict intensity varies significantly week-to-week, and not all these deaths would qualify as “state-based” under ACLED’s methodology. State-based conflicts specifically involve government forces or organized armed groups with political aims, excluding criminal violence and some forms of communal violence.

The recent UN investigations highlighting war crimes by both interim government forces and loyalist groups in March-April 2025, with evidence of systematic attacks continuing into August, suggest sustained state-based violence. The southern Syria clashes that began in July 2025 and continued through late August involved Syrian transitional government forces directly, which would clearly count as state-based conflict under ACLED’s definitions.

Model’s Answer:

ACLED’s “state-based conflict deaths” category counts fatalities directly attributable to clashes involving state actors (regular forces, security services, or state-aligned militias) — not every violent death in-country. ACLED typically reports monthly totals; the resolution will be whatever ACLED publishes for “Syria — August 2025” under that category. I do not have ACLED’s August release in front of me, so I forecast based on recent patterns from multiple monitors and the qualitative situation on the ground in late summer 2025.

What the recent context implies: independent monitors and UN reporting in mid‑August documented large-scale sectarian and coastal violence earlier in 2025 (March–April), and continuing clashes (e.g., southern/Suwayda fighting in July) produced high weekly death counts in mid‑July (one weekly update cited ~504 deaths in a week). Those indicators point to an elevated baseline of violence into mid‑2025, and ACLED flagged Syria as a high‑risk hotspot in August. However, not all recent killings are necessarily classified as “state‑based” by ACLED (some may be non‑state vs non‑state, or criminal incidents), and ACLED’s methods can diverge from local observers (SOHR, SNHR) in magnitude and classification. Given that, August’s total could easily be in the several hundreds to low thousands, but there is substantial uncertainty.

Key assumptions whose failure would materially change this forecast
1) Assumption: Violence intensity in August 2025 remained similar to July / mid‑2025 patterns (no last‑minute large offensive or ceasefire). Probability this assumption fails: 20%. If it fails upward (large offensive), probability mass shifts toward >1000 (and maybe 500–1000); if it fails downward (rapid calm), mass shifts toward 100–500.
2) Assumption: ACLED classifies a substantial share of recent deaths as “state‑based” (rather than non‑state vs non‑state or criminal). Probability this assumption fails: 25%. If ACLED excludes many deaths from the “state‑based” bucket, totals could drop into the 100–500 range.
3) Assumption: ACLED’s reporting cadence and coverage in August is similar to previous months (no major undercounting due to access issues). Probability this assumption fails: 15%. Undercoverage would push the observed count downward relative to real deaths.

Given the elevated but uneven violence, classification uncertainty, and short remaining time in August, I assign most probability to the middle bins (250–1000), with a tilt toward 500–1000 because of recent high‑fatality weeks and ACLED’s watchlist warning. I avoid extreme confidence in >1000 because classification and month‑to‑month variance can keep “state‑based” counts below that threshold, and I keep low probabilities for the bottom bins.

Final probabilities:

Less than 100: 2%
Between 100 and 250: 8%
Between 250 and 500: 30%
Between 500 and 1,000: 40%
Greater than 1,000: 20%